the board are in fact the wrongdoers, there will be no action commenced; the cost of legal proceedings will be significant; the board is not convinced that the company would have a good chance of succeeding; the miscreant director might well be impecunious and any action that is successful might not produce any benefit for the company; board members might be embarrassed by the breach and do not want it publicised, and the board might even take the view that it is better for business that the breach is not publicised; board members might decide not to take action because they are influenced by the fact that they have become friendly with the miscreant or other members of the board who might support the miscreant. 4 In the nineteenth century the English courts developed one, and many would argue several, exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle that only the company could bring proceedings to seek relief for damage suffered by the company. The courts took the view that not adopting the exceptions would be unfair to the shareholders, who might ultimately lose out if their company did not proceed against wrongdoing directors. With that in mind the courts permitted shareholders to bring proceedings, on behalf of the company, against directors with any relief going to the company. These proceedings became known as derivative actions, 5 and now the right to bring such proceedings is enshrined in the Companies Act 2006, 6 and in the companies legislation of most common law jurisdictions. derivative actions. Nevertheless, a number of commentators, 8 as well as government reports, 9 have argued that the enforcement of breaches of these duties using private mechanisms has generally been ineffective. Perhaps most notably, in the context of breaches of directors' duties, is that only a few derivative actions have been initiated, and this has been the case since these actions were introduced. 10 Because relatively little private enforcement of breaches of directors' duties seems to be occurring in the UK it has been argued that provision should be made in statute for the public enforcement of duties. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212079/bis-13-959-transparencyand-trust-enhancing-the-transparency-of-uk-company-ownership-and-increaing-trust-in-uk-business.pdf (accessed 13 August 2013). 10 Keay, "An Assessment of Private Enforcement Actions" supra n 4. While more actions have been initiated in Australia compared with the UK, the number instituted in Australia has not been substantial (I Ramsay and B Saunders, "Litigation by Shareholders and Directors: An Empirical Study of the Statutory Derivative Action" (2006) 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 397, 423-424) and this notwithstanding that a public regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, is entitled to bring proceedings against directors for breaches of duty. were introduced in the State of Victoria in 1958. 12 This was followed by the introduction of the civil penalty regime in 1993. 13 Currently the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission ("ASIC") 14 has the power to investigate possible breaches of the statutory duties. Where criminal conduct is suspected ASIC can refer the matter to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) for prosecution. If a civil breach is suspected ASIC itself is entitled to bring civil penalty proceedings against directors.
The article considers the possibility of the introduction of similar enforcement regimes in the UK. The argument advanced in this article is that despite the possible advantages that may flow from the introduction of a criminal enforcement regime, such a regime is unlikely to be adopted in the UK. Currently UK law allows a public regulator to seek disqualification orders against directors, however the other orders available under the Australian civil penalty regime, namely pecuniary penalties and compensation orders, are not available generally. As we explain later, there is a Bill before Parliament which seeks to permit courts to make compensation orders in limited cases, namely against directors who are disqualified and we offer some critique of that. The article examines the civil penalty regime that is currently available in Australia and argues that the introduction in the UK of a similar regime providing for the making of the same kind of orders would be beneficial. The article has the following structure. First, consideration is given to whether enforcement should involve criminal or civil penalty proceedings generally. Second, the article examines Australia's public enforcement model with an emphasis on the operation of the civil penalty regime. This is followed by an examination of the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission's use of the regime. Fourth, there is an assessment of the regime in the context of UK company law and practice. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered.
One word concerning terminology. The word "company" is generally used in the UK, while Australia tends to use "corporation." While there are historical differences between the terms, they are today generally viewed as being synonyms today and in this article we employ both without intending to differentiate between them.
B. CRIMINAL OR CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
Naturally any public enforcement mechanism could be criminal, civil or a mixture of both.
Whilst we do not intend to examine in any detail the policy behind the criminalisation of duties, something that has been embraced recently in New Zealand, 15 we do need to broach whether it would be appropriate to introduce such an approach in the UK. We also need to consider what sort of civil proceedings might be available to a public authority which seeks to enforce breaches of duty, if civil proceedings are preferable.
Criminal Sanctions
If adopted, a criminal enforcement regime would allow a public prosecutor to initiate a court based enforcement action against a director who was suspected of breaching the statutory directors' duties, when it is in the public interest to do so. Arguably civil penalty regimes can provide an effective alternative to criminal sanctions in situations where a criminal prosecution is problematic for the reasons outlined above.
However, this is not the only reason why civil penalty regimes may provide a preferred alternative to criminal sanctions. Some scholars believe that the reach of the criminal law 40 Ibid 288.
should be restricted where regulatory offences are concerned. 45 These scholars may support the use of civil penalties as an alternative.
Rather than treat civil penalty regimes and criminal sanctions as mutually exclusive alternatives, some scholars favor enforcement regimes that include both of these options.
Regulators who are provided with criminal sanctions and civil penalties are able to display a flexible approach to corporate misconduct 46 and can pursue criminal sanctions for the most serious offences, and civil penalties for less serious contraventions of the law. 47 These types of overlapping enforcement regimes can protect society from both under-enforcement and over-enforcement. 48 Civil penalties can be utilised in situations where the conduct, although wrongful, is not severe enough to justify the commencement of a criminal prosecution. In these situations if civil penalties were not available there could be no option for public enforcement and under-enforcement may be the result. 49 In addition, civil penalties may protect against over-enforcement "by providing a noncriminal punitive sanction for conduct 45 See, eg Coffee, supra n 29 and Bagaric, supra n 29. 46 Mann, supra n 41, 1863. Michael Gething argues that in relation to the directors' duties contained in the Corporations Act 2001 (Aust) there is a need for a range of sanctions to allow ASIC to effectively enforce the provisions. See M Gething, "Do we Really Need Criminal and Civil Penalties for Contraventions of Directors' Duties?" (1996) 24 Australian Business Law Review 375, 376. 47 In 1992 Zimring wrote that the use of civil penalties allows the regulator to have greater flexibility in his or her choice of the method of enforcement. In addition, he argued that "[c]ivil regimes … are meant to be supplements; they add more punishment and deterrence to that imposed in the criminal process and give law enforcers a second chance at punishment if the criminal prosecution misses its mark. While civil penalty regimes may be supported by scholars who believe that the criminal law can be an inadequate enforcement mechanism for corporate misconduct and by those who believe that the use of criminal law should be reduced in relation to regulatory contraventions, they are not without their detractors. Some scholars question the acceptability of using the civil rules of evidence and procedure to determine liability to what are in effect penal sanctions. Goldstein argues that the object of civil penalty regimes "seems to be to achieve the state's regulatory purpose unimpeded by the "technical" limits imposed by criminal law or criminal procedure". 53 While imprisonment is not a sanction that is available under a civil penalty regime, usually the imposition of civil penalties inflicts significant hardship on defendants, who are subjected to them. Some scholars argue that no penalty of any kind should be imposed without the protection afforded by the criminal law because this increases the risk that penalties may be wrongly imposed. "Deterrence is not enhanced by punishing the innocent, and even if it were, deterrence would then be bought at too high a price." 54 However, other scholars support the use of civil penalty regimes in circumstances where modified procedural protection is utilised. 55 Modified rules have been adopted in Australia. These rules are discussed in the next section of the article which examines the public enforcement of the Australian statutory directors' duties in detail.
C. THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT MODEL
Consideration of developments in Australia is appropriate for a number of reasons. First, Australia is a common law jurisdiction whose legal system and laws are based on UK law.
Clearly its corporate law has been derived from that applying in the UK and many In particular, the Cooney Report noted that there was community discontent because some perceived the sanctions to be inconsistent and inappropriate 72 and despite the availability of custodial sentences the courts appeared reluctant to impose them. 73 At the other end of the spectrum was the belief that competent persons may be discouraged from taking on directorships because of the perceived harshness of the criminal provisions. proceed cautiously in a civil case where a serious allegation has been made or the facts are improbable.
If the finding is likely to produce grave consequences, the evidence should be of high probative value.
The Briginshaw test focuses attention on the standard of the evidence required to prove the case to the ordinary civil standard --it is not a change in the standard of proof. There is no third standard of proof in the common law. The ordinary standard of proof required of a party who bears the onus in civil litigation in this country is proof on the balance of probabilities. That remains so even where the matter to be proved involves criminal conduct or fraud. On the other hand, the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. Thus, authoritative statements have often been made to the effect that clear or cogent or strict proof is necessary "where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found". Statements to that effect should not, however, be understood as directed to the standard of proof. Rather, they should be understood as merely reflecting a conventional perception that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has been guilty of such conduct. (citations omitted)" at (1992) 110 ALR 449, 449-50.
The purpose of this article is to examine whether consideration should be given to the adoption in the UK of an enforcement model similar to that which is available in Australia.
This necessarily involves consideration of the possibility of criminalising the duties of directors in the UK. The first thing to say is that it is highly unlikely that the UK Government would consider embracing a criminalisation of duties in the form that exists in Australia and it is even less likely that it would introduce one that is akin to that which now exists in New
Zealand. Outside of clearly criminal activity such as theft, UK law has not criminalised many requirements imposed on directors. 85 Certainly the uproar in the corporate world that occurred in New Zealand on the announcement that the Government there would introduce criminal offences for breach of directors' duties would pale into insignificance compared with the adverse reaction that would be very likely to occur in the UK if similar action were taken in the UK.
As it is unlikely that the introduction of criminal sanctions would be given serious consideration in the UK, the balance of this article considers the possibility of the adoption in that jurisdiction of some of the elements of the Australian civil penalty regime. For reasons we outline below we believe that it is possible that the introduction of some of these elements may be worthy of consideration. When considering whether such a regime ought to be introduced UK authorities would likely be interested in the way that the Australian regime has operated in practice. Accordingly, the following section of the article examines ASIC's use of the civil penalty regime including the types of applications ASIC has issued and the types of orders it has sought. Morley, the CFO contravened the statutory duty of care by failing to advise the board that the external consultants' reviews of the cash flow model were limited in nature and did not involve reviews of the key assumptions underlying the modelling. Shafron, the company secretary and general counsel contravened the duty of care by failing to advise JHIL's board and its chief executive officer that the ASX announcements were based on inappropriate cash flow modelling assumptions and failed to draw attention to the deficiencies in actuarial reports. He also failed to advise the board and its managing director of the need to disclose to the ASX all material aspects of the company's restructuring arrangements.
D. ASIC'S USE OF THE CIVIL PENALTY REGIME
The non-executive directors were ultimately all held to have breached the duty of care. The
Court was satisfied that the non-executive directors knew or ought to have known that if the announcement was misleading there was a risk that JHIL would face legal action, this would have an impact on its reputation and there would be a negative impact on its share price. The
Court was satisfied that the directors had approved the draft ASX announcement even though they must have been aware it contained misleading statements. A reasonable person occupying the office of a non-executive director of a company in JHIL's circumstances would not have behaved in this manner.
McDonald was disqualified from acting as a director for 15 years and was ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty of $350,000 (£192,000). Shafron and Morley were disqualified for 7 and 2 years respectively and ordered to pay pecuniary penalties of AUD $75,000 (£41,000) and AUD $20,000 (£11,000) 99 respectively. The seven non-executive directors were disqualified from acting as directors for periods ranging from 23 months to 27 months and were ordered to pay pecuniary penalties ranging from AUD $20,000 (£11,000) to AUD $25,000 (£13,500). to ask questions about the accuracy of these financial reports, had not taken all the steps necessary to ensure the accounts were accurate, and had not acted upon information they
should have known about the financial position of the company. 101 Declarations of contravention were made against all directors. One director was ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty of AUD $30,000 (£16,300) and the former Chief Financial Officer was disqualified from managing corporations for two years. 102 No penalties were imposed on the other directors despite declarations of contravention having been made against them. The failure to impose penalties on some of the directors has been the subject of criticism. 103 
Types of Orders Sought by ASIC
As stated above, the orders that are available under the Australian civil penalty regime are pecuniary penalty, disqualification and compensation orders. The primary purpose of the pecuniary penalty is to punish the contravening director and to provide personal and general deterrence. 104 Disqualification orders remove unfit directors from office, thereby providing protection for the public against future misuse of the corporate structure 105 by such unfit directors. 106 A disqualification order may also involve aspects of personal and general deterrence and can have a punitive effect. 107 The aim of the compensation order is to obtain recompense for the company that has suffered a loss as a result of the director's breach of duty.
The order that has been the most sought by ASIC is the disqualification order, followed by pecuniary penalties and compensation orders. 108 The fact that disqualification orders are highly sought after indicates that ASIC's priority in issuing proceedings alleging a contravention of the directors' duty provisions is to protect the larger community by removing unfit directors from office. ASIC also prioritises deterrence. Both pecuniary penalties and disqualification orders are designed to be punitive and to send a deterrent message to the market and in all but one of the civil penalty applications issued by ASIC in the last 21 years the regulator sought either one or both of these orders. 109 A compensation order has never been the sole order sought.
Problems with the Australian Civil Penalty Regime
The Australian civil penalty regime has not been without its difficulties. One of those is the imposition of low penalties in some recent cases, including the Centro case discussed above.
Other difficulties highlighted by Cominio include evidential and procedural difficulties that she argues impacts on ASIC's ability to make effective use of these provisions. in a number of recent cases when ASIC has chosen to bring civil penalty proceedings, instead of those proceedings being the cost-effective and timely enforcement response to contravening conduct initially contemplated, proceedings have been expensive … Moreover, they underscore the uncertainty surrounding the applicable rules of procedure in civil penalty cases and lack of consistency in the manner that cases are dealt with by different courts and judges. 114 (citations omitted)
Comino calls for legislative intervention to resolve these issues. 115 If the introduction of a similar enforcement regime is contemplated in the UK lessons should be learnt from the Australian experience and consideration should be given to resolving these procedural issues prior to the adoption of such a regime.
E. APPLICATION OF THE CIVIL PENALTY REGIME TO THE UK
A civil penalty regime of the type embraced by Australia provides powerful weapons. This part of the article assesses whether those weapons should be adopted in the UK, either totally or partially, and what obstacles there might be to such adoption.
Clearly the UK position has been, in general terms, to keep hard law in the form of regulation to a minimum. Perhaps this is the UK staying true to its laissez-faire foundations, 
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The foremost characteristic of it is that it provides for a "comply or explain" approach. 119 This was a term frequently used in the later 1980s and early 1990s in Australia. It was used by Trevor Sykes when referring to some banks in Australia following deregulation in the 1980s ("Australia's Banking Industry" and available at : http://www.abc.net.au/money/currency/features/feat3.htm (accessed, 26 May 2014). though it was concluded by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards that the Bank's board "had abrogated and remitted to the executive management the formulation of strategy, a matter for which the Board should properly have been responsible," 120 no director was subject to action. The reasons for this are to be found in respect of enforcement, although concern was voiced that the law, in any event, might not have favoured a claim. One cannot help thinking that if the collapses that were seen in the UK had occurred in Australia ASIC would have taken some action against one or more directors. This is probably because ASIC has had a more aggressive approach to enforcement than the now defunct Financial Services Authority ("FSA"), 121 or any other government bodies, had, and arguably there has been in Australia a greater willingness to see public intervention in commercial and corporate operations than in the UK, 122 again perhaps an indication that the UK retains a very laissezfaire approach.
There appears to be a public perception that directors, and particularly directors of banks, Mr Jonny Cameron, RBS Executive Director and Chairman of RBS's Global Banking and Markets Division came to a settlement with the FSA whereby he "committed not to perform any significant influence function in relation to any regulated activity or to undertake any further full-time employment in the financial services industry. As part of this settlement, the FSA agreed it would not take any disciplinary action against Mr Cameron. The FSA did not make any findings of regulatory breach against Mr Cameron and he did not make Financial Crisis. This is notwithstanding the fact that commentators have suggested that there might well have been breaches committed by some directors. For example, it has been submitted by some corporate governance authorities that the Northern Rock board did not act with due diligence before it was subject to the first "run" on a UK bank since the mid- against directors are the most important of the penalties that courts in Australia can order.
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The UK already has a disqualification process that is reasonably robust and well-used. As in Australia, the regime for disqualification in the UK plays an important role in the regulation of companies and their directors, 129 and can have a significant effect on the life of a director.
Directors can be disqualified from acting as such for up to 15 years. In fact in the UK disqualification is effectively the only public intervention in dealing with wrongdoing or lax directors. 130 There are actions presently available to regulators in relation to directors and An examination of the above figures reveals that during this period most disqualification orders imposed in the UK were imposed on directors of insolvent companies or on directors who had committed a criminal offence. In addition, the number of disqualification orders imposed on directors of live companies in situations where misconduct by them had been revealed has decreased markedly in recent years. This form of disqualification is the one that has the most in common with the disqualification provision available under the Australian civil penalty regime. What is different however is that the UK provision allows for a maximum period of disqualification of 15 years whereas the Australian provision is unlimited.
136 132 The disqualifications are likely to have been based on s.6 of CDDA. This provision allows for the disqualification of directors who are unfit because of the fact that they have been directors of companies that have become insolvent. 133 The disqualifications are likely to have been based on s.6 of CDDA 134 The disqualifications are likely to have been based on s.8 of CDDA. This provision permits the disqualification of directors who are unfit after their companies have been subject to investigation. 135 These orders would have been made under any of ss 2-5 of the CDDA. These provisions permit, for instance, disqualification where directors have been convicted of indictable offences or breached companies legislation. 136 As noted above some permanent disqualification orders have been imposed by the Australian courts.
While the UK has a disqualification provision, what it obviously lacks is power for a court to be able to order a financial penalty or a compensation order against a director following the breach of the statutory duties. Recently, the Government has been concerned 137 that creditors, in particular, who are the ones who usually lose out the most if a company becomes insolvent, do get some form of compensation from directors where the latter have breached their duties, a matter to which we will return shortly.
It is interesting that the New Zealand government, before putting forward its programme for criminalisation of directors' breaches of duty, countenanced civil penalty orders, but rejected them. The two primary reasons given were that the introduction of such orders provides: "too great a risk of people being deterred from taking on directorships" and would place "the regulator in the position of second-guessing the soundness of directors' business decisions." 138 It is likely that a similar reaction would be registered in the UK to the introduction of a civil penalty regime.
However, the empirical evidence concerning the likely deterrence factor of tightening up legislation relative to directors' duties has been mixed over the years. It has been submitted that it is not possible to determine whether the fear that potential enforcement overly deters directors such that it discourages individuals from assuming posts as directors unless they are There is an indication here that the Government is certainly concerned about shareholders in solvent companies who indirectly lose out if their companies' directors act wrongly and cause their companies loss. It might also be interpreted by some as demonstrating concern for a wider group of stakeholders.
The Discussion Paper did advert to the Australian regime and particularly to the fact that the regime may provide for a civil penalty award and compensatory awards. 152 The Paper did mention compensation for creditors, but, as we have seen, the Australian regime is not limited to compensation orders for creditors.
In the Government's Response to the comments of respondents to its Discussion Paper it stated that two-thirds of responses broadly supported the proposal to give courts the power to make compensatory awards against those directors who were disqualified. 153 The Department has said that it wishes to see directors who have failed to act according to acceptable standards to be held financially accountable for the loss that they have caused to creditors, and it will seek to give power to the courts to make compensation orders against disqualified directors in appropriate cases.
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The views of the Department have now been included in provisions of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill ("the Bill"), which has been laid before Parliament. If the Bill becomes law then s 98 will provide for the inclusion of a new provision in the Company
Directors' Disqualification Act 1986, namely s 15A. This provision will enable courts to order a director to pay compensation to his or her company as a contribution to its assets; or to order the payment of compensation to specified creditors of the company on the condition that the director is disqualified pursuant to an order or undertaking and the conduct leading to the disqualification order or undertaking has caused loss to one or more creditors of an insolvent company of which the director has at some time been a director. This is laudable but it will not address some of the shortcomings which we have mentioned in this article.
First, the new legislation will not provide any help to those who lose out in companies where directors are not disqualified. This could occur in one of two kinds of cases. First, where the Secretary of State does not think that there are sufficient grounds for disqualification or it is thought that the construction of a case for disqualification is not warranted given the other claims on Departmental funds, and so no petition for disqualification is made. Second, a petition for disqualification fails because a judge does not think that the order is warranted, but the judge would be willing to order compensation for those who lost out because of the director's actions. The second shortcoming that is not addressed in the Bill is courts are not permitted to make any compensation order where the company is not insolvent. This, therefore, lays the burden squarely on shareholders in solvent companies to take any action to recover a loss sustained by the company. So, even if the Bill becomes law, shareholders would still have to institute derivative actions against miscreant directors and they have been reluctant to do so. 155 Also, as we have mentioned earlier, ASIC has enforced duties against directors of solvent companies, and arguably to good effect. For instance, in the Centro case it could be argued that the action taken has provided "a wake-up call" to directors who have, inter alia, failed to examine financial papers sufficiently, and may well encourage more vigilance amongst directors when it comes to approving financial reports.
It might be said that permitting compensation orders in relation to insolvent companies is meritorious because it is designed to relieve the plight of long-suffering creditors, and we would fully assent to that. Also the point might be made that if enforcement were extended to solvent companies then a government body would be doing the work that should be done by the shareholders. But as argued elsewhere, the shareholders who are not likely to take action, because of the many obstacles put in front of them, are those who are vulnerable and perhaps worthy of protection. 156 The public has a concern for the integrity of the corporate governance system that operates in the UK, and directors' duties are an important element in that system. In addition the enforcement of breaches of duty is a significant aspect of the accountability of directors. Some courts have considered the notion of community Further, if the breach were to affect the liquidity of the company in some way then this might lead to insolvency and that would potentially have a greater effect on all stakeholders.
160
Breaches of duty can lead to a plethora of ramifications, such as employee redundancies, closure of offices and plants and thereby affecting local communities and the payment of reduced tax to the taxation authorities. As drafted the Bill is only concerned with the plight of creditors, and, it is submitted, there should be a concern for a wider range of stakeholders, and certainly the shareholders.
Leaving the provision in the Bill aside, we note also that there was no comment in the Government's Response to comments it received in relation to its discussion paper concerning civil penalty orders. It has been said by one commentator who was discussing these provisions in the context of Singapore that the use of such a mechanism would be the best response to breaches of the director's duty of care and skill as "this will secure regulatory compliance by ensuring that the court has ample scope to deliver a proportionate sanction in the circumstances of every contravention."
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The commentator's discussion was limited to breaches of duty of care and skill but there did not appear to be any intention to exclude breaches of loyalty duties from what he was saying. We submit that issues relating to duties of care, in the context of this matter, are no different than those relating to the duties of loyalty.
F. CONCLUSION
This article considered the possibility of the introduction of additional public enforcement mechanisms in the UK for the enforcement of directors' duties. For the reasons outlined in this article we conclude that the introduction of criminal sanction is unlikely to be countenanced. Therefore, the proposal in this article is to introduce in the UK enforcement mechanisms akin to those that are available under the Australian civil penalty regime. This
proposal goes beyond what was suggested by the Department of Business Innovation and Skills and, as it would apply to directors of solvent companies, it also goes beyond what is being provided for in the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill. Notwithstanding this, our proposal is based on the same reasoning as contained in the Department's Discussion Paper and in the Bill. The present system is not working well, is subject to a degree of contempt from the general public, and the present provision for the enforcement of breaches needs to be supplemented. In particular the introduction of pecuniary penalty orders, in addition to the likely introduction of compensation orders together with the existing disqualification, could well make directors take the performance of their duties more seriously and deter them from committing breaches of duty.
The implementation in the UK of such a regime to complement the public enforcement of breaches of directors' duties would go some way to answering the challenges of some that the regime that is able to be implemented in appropriate situations adds credibility to a nation's oversight of corporate affairs. Public enforcement should not exclude opportunities for private enforcement; the two forms should complement each other as they tend to do in Australia.
